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Abstract
We model worker heterogeneity in the rents from being employed in a Diamond-Mortensen-
Pissarides model of matching and unemployment. We show that heterogeneity, re￿ ecting
di⁄erences in match quality and worker assets, reduces the extent of ￿ uctuations in separa-
tions and unemployment. We ￿nd that the model faces a trade-o⁄￿ it cannot produce both
realistic dispersion in wages across workers and realistic cyclical ￿ uctuations in unemploy-
ment.
￿We thank Evgenia Dechter for her excellent research assistance; we thank Mark Aguiar, Ricardo Lagos, Iourii
Manovski, and Randy Wright for helpful suggestions.1. Introduction
Shimer (2005), Hall (2005), and Costain and Reiter (2003) each argue that matching models with
￿ exible wages fail to explain business cycle ￿ uctuations￿ the models generate much more pro-
cyclical wages and much less cyclical unemployment and job ￿nding rates than observed. But, as
discussed by Mortensen and Nagypal (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), this negative
conclusion rests on an assumption that employment renders substantial economic rents relative
to the monetary, home production, and leisure bene￿ts to not being employed in the market.
For example, Hagedorn and Manovski, by allowing the payout to unemployment to replace 95
percent that of employment, are able to rationalize the cyclical volatility of unemployment under
the matching model with ￿ exible wages and exogenous separations. So establishing the rents
from employment is key to judging how well the matching model captures cyclical ￿ uctuations.
Judging the size of these rents a priori is problematic as they re￿ ect, not only direct payments,
but also individuals￿valuations of leisure and home production.
We shed light on this question by considering endogenous separations. We introduce het-
erogeneity in reservation wages into a business cycle model of separations, matching, and un-
employment. As in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), we allow workers to face shocks to their
employment matches, with bad draws possibly leading to endogenous separations. We depart
from Mortensen and Pissarides by allowing for diminishing marginal utility in consumption and
imperfect insurance as in Aiyagari (1994). As a result, willingness to trade work for search
depends on the worker￿ s wealth￿ workers with lower savings, re￿ ecting bad past earnings shocks,
are less willing to separate. The heterogeneity in match quality and assets jointly determine
the distribution of rents to being employed. In turn, this distribution drives both the level and
cyclicality of unemployment.
We ￿nd a trade-o⁄ between generating realistic dispersion in wages re￿ ecting match quality
and realistic cyclical ￿ uctuations in unemployment. For instance, with the high replacement
rate suggested by Hagedorn and Manovski, the model can generate reasonable average rates of
separation and unemployment only if shocks to match quality are extremely small, so small that
the cross-sectional standard deviation in wages from match quality is less than two percent. With
Shimer￿ s calibrated replacement rate of 40 percent, by contrast, substantial shocks to match
quality are required to match average turnover and unemployment rates, with these shocks
generating a cross-sectional standard deviation in wages from match quality of 18 percent.
We argue that this latter ￿gure, 18 percent, is consistent with micro data, in particular the
1importance of the match component to earnings dispersion estimated by Woodcock (2007) using
matched worker-￿rm data. Thus we conclude that the calibrated search and matching model,
with reasonable wage dispersion, fails to capture the cyclicality of unemployment rates.
The model is presented in the next section then calibrated in Section 3. In Section 4 we
examine the model￿ s steady-state features. We show that both a high replacement rate and little
heterogeneity, in match quality and assets, are key for producing an economy with many workers
with low rents from employment￿ the scenario that generates a large response of unemployment
to aggregate shocks. We require our benchmark economy to exhibit realistic separation and
unemployment rates and a reasonable dispersion in wages re￿ ecting match quality. In turn,
this requires a relatively low replacement rate, comparable to Shimer￿ s calibration, and sig-
ni￿cant match quality shocks. We consider an alternative economy that matches the average
unemployment with a high replacement rate, but it requires extremely small shocks to match
quality.
The model￿ s cyclical predictions are presented in Section 5. The model can generate a very
cyclical unemployment rate, but only if there is little dispersion in match quality. With little
cross-sectional dispersion there is an important spike up in separations at the onset of a down-
turn. Secondly, again for low dispersion, the rents to vacancy creation are highly procyclical.
Thirdly, the model generates a new avenue for cyclicality in unemployment￿ in response to higher
expected unemployment duration, separations become skewed toward workers with higher assets
and higher reservation match qualities. Because these workers generate smaller expected sur-
plus to employers, this acts to further depress vacancy creation in a recession. However, for our
benchmark model that displays reasonable dispersion in match wages, we ￿nd that separations,
vacancies, and unemployment all exhibit much less cyclicality than seen in the data.
Besides Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), an antecedent to our model is Chang and Kim
(2006, 2007). They show that the cross-sectional distributions of wealth and worker productiv-
ity play a critical role in determining the elasticity of aggregate labor supply in a competitive
equilibrium. Nakajima (2007), Shao and Silos (2007), and Krusell, Mukoyama, and Sahin (2008)
have also recently adopted diminishing marginal utility in consumption and imperfect risk shar-
ing into the Mortensen-Pissarides model.1 However, only Shao and Silos allow for heterogeneous
1Other papers that entertain wealth e⁄ects in modeling search include Pissarides (1987), Gomez, Greenwood,
and Rebelo (2001), and Hall (2006). Haefke and Reiter (2006) generate dispersion in reservation wages, while
maintaining linear utility and no match-speci￿c productivity, by assuming heterogeneity in individuals￿value
of home production. Several papers (Darby, Haltiwanger, and Plant, 1985, Baker, 1992, and Pries, 2007) have
argued that lower job-￿nding rates during recessions may re￿ ect a compositional shift toward workers who display
2productivity; and none of these authors allows for endogenous separations.
2. Model
We build on the model of cyclical unemployment in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). We depart
from Mortensen and Pissarides by letting workers be risk averse, face a borrowing constraint,
and value leisure, distinct from goods consumption, from being unemployed.
2.1. Environment


















where 0 < ￿ < 1 is the discount factor, and ct(> 0) is consumption. The parameter B denotes
the utility from leisure when unemployed. lt is 1 when unemployed and otherwise zero. In
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), and many extensions, there is no valuation of leisure; so a
marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption is not de￿ned. Here the marginal
rate of substitution (c￿￿=B ) is decreasing in c. This provides the basis for a worker￿ s reservation
match quality to be increasing in consumption and thereby savings.
Each period a worker either works (employed) or searches for a job (unemployed). A worker,
when working, earns wage w. If unemployed, a worker receives an unemployment bene￿t b.
Each can borrow or lend at a given real interest rate r by trading the asset a. But there is a
limit, a, that one can borrow; that is at > a. Real interest rate r is determined exogenously to
￿ uctuations in this particular economy (small open economy).
There is also a continuum of identical agents we refer to as entrepreneurs (or ￿rms). En-
trepreneurs have the ability to create job vacancies with a cost ￿ per vacancy. Entrepreneurs
are risk neutral (diversifying ownership of their investments across many vacancies and across









There are two technologies in this economy, one that describes the production of output by
lower job-￿nding rates. But these papers impose this shift exogenously, whereas our model, by allowing for wealth
e⁄ects, predicts such a shift in recessions toward unemployed workers with high reservation match qualities.
3a matched worker-entrepreneur pair and another that describes the process by which workers
and entrepreneurs become matched. A matched pair produces output
yt = ztxt
where zt is aggregate productivity and xt is idiosyncratic match-speci￿c productivity (i.e., match
quality). Both aggregate productivity and idiosyncratic productivity evolve over time according
to Markov processes, respectively Pr[zt+1 < z0jzt = z] = D(z0jz) and Pr[xt+1 < x0jxt = x] =
F(x0jx). For newly formed matches, idiosyncratic productivity starts at the mean value of the
unconditional distribution, which is denoted by ￿ x.2
The number of new meetings between the unemployed and vacancies is determined by a
matching function
m(v;u) = ￿u1￿￿v￿
where v is the number of vacancies and u is the number of unemployed workers. The matching
rate for an unemployed worker is p(￿) = m(v;u)=u = ￿￿￿, where ￿ = v=u is the vacancy-
unemployment ratio, the labor market tightness. The probability that a vacant job matches
with a worker is q(￿) = m(v;u)=v = ￿￿￿￿1.
A matched worker-￿rm constitutes a bilateral monopoly. We assume the wage is set by
bargaining between the worker and ￿rm over the match surplus. This is discussed in the next
subsection. The match surplus re￿ ects the value of the match relative to the summed worker￿ s
value of being unemployed and the entrepreneur￿ s value of an unmatched vacancy (which is zero
in equilibrium). There are no bargaining rigidities; separations are e¢ cient for the worker-￿rm
pair, occurring if and only if match surplus falls below zero.
The timing of events can be summarized as follows.
1. At the beginning of each period matches from the previous period￿ s search and matching
are realized. Also aggregate productivity z and each match￿ s idiosyncratic productivity x
2With dispersion in initial match quality, then workers will turn down some new matches. This would,
everything else equal, increase unemployment duration and the average rate of unemployment, especially for
the economy calibrated below to re￿ ect signi￿cant wage dispersion. Therefore, to maintain the target rate of
unemployment, this extension would require a lower value of unemployment (parameter B) for our calibrated
model. This would act to further reduce the model￿ s ability to produce cyclical ￿ uctuations in unemployment.
Because this extension predictably reinforces our conclusion, that there is a severe tradeo⁄ between generating
realistic wage dispersion and unemployment cyclicality, we ignore it in order to streamline our model. Hornstein,
Krusell, and Violante (2006) examine at length the tension between generating reasonable wage dispersion and
average unemployment duration in a calibrated Diamanond-Mortensen-Pissarides model.
4are realized.
2. Upon observing x and z; matched workers and entrepreneurs decide whether to continue
as an employed match. Workers breaking up with an entrepreneur become unemployed.
There is no later recall of matches.
3. For employed matches, production takes place with the wage re￿ ecting worker-￿rm bar-
gaining. Also at this time, unemployed workers and vacancies engage in the search/matching
process.
2.2. Value functions
Consider a recursive representation, where W, U, J, and V denote respectively the values
for the employed, unemployed, a matched entrepreneur, and a vacancy. All value functions
depend on the measures of workers. In each labor market, two measures capture the distribution
of workers: ￿(a;x) and  (a), respectively, represent the measures of employed workers and
unemployed workers during the period.3 The evolution of these measures is given by T, i.e.,
(￿0; 0) = T(￿; ;z). For notational convenience, let s = (z;￿; ).













































cu = (1 + r)a + b ￿ a0
u
3Let A and X denote sets of all possible realizations of a and x, respectively. Then ￿(a;x) is de￿ned over
￿-algebra of A ￿ X while  (a) is de￿ned over ￿-algebra of A.
5a0
u ￿ a:
For an entrepreneur the value of a matched job is:






The value of a vacancy is:














(1 ￿ q(￿(s)))V (s0); (2.4)
where recall that ￿ is the vacancy posting cost and q(￿) is the probability that a vacancy is
￿lled. e  (a0
u) denotes the measure of unemployed workers at the end of a period after decisions
on asset accumulation are made.
2.3. Wage Bargaining
There is a setting for bilateral bargaining between a matched vacancy and worker. We follow











S(a;x;s) = W(a;x;s) ￿ U(a;s) + J(a;x;s) ￿ V (s);
for all (a;x;s).4
The Nash solution generates a wage that is increasing in a worker￿ s assets, re￿ ecting that
being unemployed is less painful for a worker with greater assets. (Below see Figure 1.) In turn,
this makes the vacancy creation decision depend on the assets of the unemployed. We believe
these features potentially generalize to settings with wage posting by ￿rms and directed search
by workers. For instance, Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) model directed search by risk averse
workers. They show that the distribution of posted wages exhibits a higher mean, with longer
queues, if workers are less risk averse, as then workers are less willing to take lower wages in order
to raise the probability of employment. We would expect increased assets for the unemployed,
4Rubinstein (1982) demonstrates in a stationary environment that the Nash solution can be interpreted as
the outcome of a noncooperative game with sequential o⁄ers. In our stochastic setting without linear utility this
interpretation does not literally hold (Coles and Wright, 1998.) We adopt the Nash solution, however, partly for
comparability with the related literature.
6for given risk aversion, to exhibit comparative statics in this same direction in their setting.
2.4. Evolution of measures































for all A0 ￿ A and X0 ￿ X.
2.5. Equilibrium
The equilibrium consists of a set of value functions, W(a;x;s), U(a;s), J(a;x;s), a set of deci-
sion rules for consumption ce(a;x;s), cu(a;s), asset holdings a0
e(a;x;s), a0
u(a;s), and separating
x￿(a;x;s), the wage schedule w(a;x;s), the labor-market tightness ￿(s), and a law of motion for
the distribution, (￿0; 0) = T(￿; ;z). Equilibrium is de￿ned by the following.
1. (Optimal Savings): Given ￿, w, ￿ ,  , and T, a0 solves the Bellman equations for W, U,
J and V in (2.1), (2.2), (2.3), and (2.4).
2. (Optimal Separation): Given W, U, J, V , ￿,  , and T, x￿ satis￿es S(a;x￿;s) = 0.
3. (Nash Bargaining): Given W, U, J and V , w satis￿es (2.5).
4. (Free Entry): Given w, x￿;J, ￿,  , and T, the vacancies are posted until V = 0.
5. (Rational Expectations): Given a0
e, a0
u and x￿, the law of motion for distribution (￿0; 0) =
T(￿; ) is described in (2.6) and (2.7).
3. Model Calibration
We calibrate our model in order to present its predictions for business cycle ￿ uctuations. But,
prior to considering cycles, in Section 4 we display the model￿ s steady-state features, in particular
7showing how the heterogeneity of worker￿ s match quality and assets determine the distribution
of rents to employment.
3.1. The benchmark economy
We consider two calibrated models that yield the same steady-state rates of separations and
unemployment, but di⁄er sharply in their predictions for the average level, and dispersion, in
match rents. Our benchmark calibration re￿ ects sizable rents to employment. These rents
primarily re￿ ect dispersion in wages due to important di⁄erences in match quality. We argue
this cross-sectional dispersion is consistent with that estimated on matched employer, employee
data (Woodcock, 2007). We also describe an alternative calibration that is designed to generate
sizable cyclical ￿ uctuations. But this calibration requires remarkably small dispersion in match
quality.
Starting with preferences, we assume a relative risk aversion parameter ￿ equal to one. We
choose a monthly discount factor ￿ of 0.995 and an annualized real interest rate of 6 percent.
These together generate average assets equal to 18 months of labor earnings, which is about
the median ratio of net worth to family earnings we calculate from the Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP) data. (See Bils, Chang, and Kim, 2007, for more details on
statistics derived from the SIPP.) We set the borrowing constraint to six, so approximately six
month labor income, as we see few households in the SIPP with unsecured debt exceeding this
amount. The borrowing constraint has a relatively small impact on average asset holdings.
The key outcomes we target are the average rates of unemployment and separations. We
target an average unemployment rate of 6 percent and a monthly separation rate of 2 percent.
(A separation rate of 2 percent is consistent with what we see for the SIPP data.) These rates for
unemployment and separations imply a steady-state job ￿nding rate, of 0.313, a rate consistent
with transition hazards reported by Meyer (1990). The vacancy posting cost ￿ is chosen so
that the vacancy-unemployment ratio (￿) is normalized to 1 in the steady state. The matching
technology is Cobb-Douglas; m(v;u) = :313v￿u1￿￿ hits the steady-state ￿nding rate. We set
the matching power parameter ￿ to 0.5.
Remaining to calibrate are the payouts to being unemployed, which are unemployment in-
surance b and leisure utility B, and the magnitude of match-speci￿c shocks. These are key
determinants of rates of separations and unemployment. If unemployment is made more attrac-
tive, everything else equal, this clearly leads to higher separation and unemployment rates. We
calibrate our benchmark economy to generate rents to employment comparable to that in Shimer
8(2005). To do so, we ￿rst considered a special case of our model that, like Shimer￿ s, has linear
utility and no match-quality shocks or endogenous separations￿ separations occur exogenously
at a rate of 2 percent monthly. We follow Shimer by calibrating unemployment insurance to
b = 0:4; with B = 0. That economy generates capitalized match surplus (S = W +J) of 3.3, that
is, a little over three months of match output. This in turn directly implies a vacancy creation
cost ￿ of 0.52 (half of a month￿ s output). We calibrate our benchmark economy to exhibit these
same values, S = 3:3 and ￿ = 0:52. Keeping b = 0:4, we ￿nd this requires a value for leisure
of B = 0:15: That is, a consumer views this leisure comparably, in terms of ￿ ow utility, to 15
percent higher consumption.
Greater match-quality shocks, like higher replacement rates, create more separations and
higher average unemployment. We set the persistence of the match-speci￿c shock to be quite
high, ￿x = 0:97. Finally, given the other parameters, we set the standard deviation of these
match-quality shocks in order achieve the target separation and unemployment rates of 2 and 6
percent. This dictates ￿x = 0:130. We ￿nd this generates a standard deviation of wages across
workers of 18 percent. We view this as a reasonable match to data, as it is consistent with
the size of the match component in the dispersion of earnings estimated by Woodcock (2007).
Woodcock allows for individual, employer, and match components in explaining dispersion in
(ln)earnings for a large sample of matched employer-employee records across 37 states. He
￿nds a variance of the match component in earnings that is nearly one-￿fth the magnitude of
overall earnings variance. If we assume this same ratio holds for (ln)wage rates, and allow for a
standard deviation for (ln)wages of 0.40 to 0.45, this implies a standard deviation in wages from
match quality of 18 to 20 percent.5 This is extremely close to our benchmark model￿ s standard
deviation of wages of 18 percent.6
3.2. The high-volatility economy
For contrast, we consider a cyclically sensitive economy calibrated so that, in response to ag-
gregate shocks to productivity, it exhibits a standard deviation of unemployment that is 9.5
times that in productivity￿ where 9.5 re￿ ects the ratio of these standard deviations reported
by Shimer (2005). To achieve this targeted cyclicality, while maintaining an average rate of 6
5Woodcock￿ s sample re￿ ects 49 million person-year observations over the years 1990 to 1999 for workers aged
25 to 65. The data re￿ ect a matching of Census and state unemployment insurance data. The statement of a
standard deviation for (ln)wages of 0.40 to 0.45 re￿ ects CPS data for 1990 to 2002 for workers ages 25 to 65.
These data show standard deviations in ln(wages) of 0.44 for men and 0.43 for women.
6The dispersion in wages for our model partially re￿ ects dispersion in assets, as wages are increasing in assets.
But most of the wage dispersion for the model re￿ ects di⁄erences in match quality.
9percent unemployment, we free up the leisure value of unemployment B and the variability of
match-quality shocks ￿x, keeping other parameters at their benchmark values.7 The economic
payo⁄s while unemployed are key, not only to the average rate of unemployment, but also to
its cyclical volatility (Hagedorn and Manovski, 2008, and Mortensen and Nagypal, 2005)￿ less
surplus to employment increases cyclical volatility of vacancies and unemployment. By contrast,
greater volatility of match-speci￿c productivity (higher ￿x) has opposite impacts on the level
versus cyclical volatility of unemployment. Greater match-quality shocks create more separa-
tions and higher average unemployment, but actually reduce the cyclical volatility of separations
and unemployment. With greater match-quality shocks workers become sorted over time into
matches with signi￿cant match surplus. This makes their separations less responsive to cyclical
￿ uctuations in productivity. Because the level of unemployment is increasing in both B and ￿x,
but its cyclicality responds oppositely to the two parameters, we can maintain unemployment￿ s
average rate of 6 percent, while increasing its cyclicality, by appropriately increasing B in con-
junction with decreasing ￿x. We ￿nd that the combination B = 0:51; ￿x = 0:014 produces a
standard deviation of unemployment that is 9.5 times that for productivity. We show that this
economy, though generating realistic cyclicality, yields implausibly little cross-sectional wage
dispersion, with a standard deviation of wages of only 1.9 percent.
Table 1 summarizes the calibrated parameters with values employed for both the benchmark
and high-volatility economies.
4. Steady-state Statistics and the Distribution of Match Rents
We present statistics for the model￿ s steady state to illustrate how a worker￿ s assets and match
quality determine his wage, reservation match quality, and the surplus from employment. We
focus on the distribution of surplus from employent because this is key in determining cyclicality
of separations, vacancy creation, and unemployment for the model. We contrast the distribution
of rents to employment from our benchmark model to those for the economy calibrated to
generate high cyclical volatility in unemployment.
Starting with the benchmark economy, Figure 1 displays the values of the wage, W ￿U; and
J as functions of a worker￿ s assets. These relations are illustrated for three di⁄erent values for
match quality x. Higher values of match quality are directly associated with higher wages and
capitalized value of employment W, while irrelevant for U. So both W￿U and J correspondingly
7It requires a very slightly di⁄erent discount factor (￿ = 0:9949, versus 0:9948 for the benchmark) to hit
average asset holding of 18 months earnings.
10increase with match quality. Focusing on assets, both W and U increase with assets. But having
low assets particularly lowers the value of being unemployed, resulting in a lower bargained wage.
Figure 1 displays this positive relation between assets and wages. Both W ￿U and J (re￿ ecting
the higher wage) decrease in worker assets. The sharpest positive relation of the wage to assets,
and opposite reaction in J, is concentrated at the very low end of assets, near or below zero.8
Focusing on ￿rm rents J, we see that high assets lessens the expected rents of hiring a worker.
In turn this provides a channel from assets, speci￿cally the assets of the unemployed, to vacancy
creation￿ high assets among the unemployed, everything else equal, reduces desired vacancies.
This implies the cyclicality of assets for the unemployed will in￿ uence (oppositely) the cyclicality
of vacancy creation.
The top panel of Figure 2 presents the distribution of assets separately for employed and
unemployed workers. The model succeeds in generating a fairly wide dispersion in assets, given
workers di⁄er only in the history of the quality of employment matches and history of unem-
ployment durations. Because the unemployed draw down assets to maintain consumption, they
exibit average assets of 21 percent less than the employed (14.7 compared to 18.1). The unem-
ployed exhibit lower consumption, by 9 percent, than the employed. The bottom panel of Figure
2 displays how a worker￿ s critical value for match quality x￿ depends positively on assets￿ the
critical match quality increases with assets throughout the range of relevant asset holding. Pro-
jecting this policy for x￿ on the distribution for assets in the top panel of Figure 2 yields the
distribution for x￿. This distribution exhibits a standard deviation of 3.3 percent.
Statistics for unemployment, turnover, and assets for the benchmark economy are presented
in Table 2. The table also reports that the cross-sectional standard deviation of (ln)wages is 18.0
percent. As discussed under calibrating, we perceive this statistic to be quite consistent with the
importance of the employer/employee match component in earnings dispersion, as estimated by
Woodcock (2007).
Figure 3 presents the distribution of workers￿ln(wages) relative to the critical wage, ln(w￿),
at which the worker is indi⁄erent to separating. (w￿ is the bargained wage associated with
critical match quality x￿.) This di⁄erence, ln(w)￿ln(w￿), re￿ ects the ￿ ow rents associated with
the employment match. These rents are signi￿cant for the benchmark economy, averaging 26
percent. If we consider a drop in match quality su¢ cient to reduce the wage by 10 percent,
8The assumptions of Nash bargaining and a coe¢ cient of risk aversion of one imply that J equals W ￿U times
the worker￿ s consumption. For this reason J decreases less than W ￿U with worker assets. This is more relevant
at low asset levels, where consumption responds more to assets. For instance, for x = 1, an increase in assets
from 0 to 5 yields a drop in J of about two-thirds that in W ￿ U.
11holding w￿ una⁄ected, this would induce only about 16 percent of workers to separate. The
standard deviation across workers of the di⁄erential ln(w) ￿ ln(w￿) equals 17.8 percent. This
dispersion is largely driven by dispersion in the wage, not w￿, and in turn re￿ ects the dispersion
in match quality. Recall that ln(wages) has a standard deviation of 18.0 percent. By contrast
ln(w￿) has standard deviation of only 1.5 percent.
The magnitude of the di⁄erential ln(w) ￿ ln(w￿) is key to the economy￿ s cyclical volatility.
A negative aggregate shock induces only a small response in separations if few workers display
wages close to the reservation wage w￿. Greater dispersion in ln(w) ￿ ln(w￿), absent search
frictions, implies a less elastic aggregate labor supply response to aggregate shocks￿ in a search
and matching model this is manifested by less response in separations. Secondly, a drop, say of
one percent, in aggregate productivity represents a much smaller percentage hit to the expected
payout to ￿lling a vacancy if the average rents to employment are large. Therefore, considerable
rents, such as depicted for the benchmark economy in Figure 3, will act to reduce the cyclicalilty
of both separations and vacancy creation.
By contrast, the high-volatility economy displays much less dispersion in match quality and
smaller rents to employment. Results for this model economy are given in Figures 4 and 5. The
top panel of Figure 4 presents the distribution of assets separately for employed and unemployed
workers; the bottom panel displays how a worker￿ s critical match quality x￿ depends on assets.
Compared to the benchmark economy, the high-volatility economy generates a smaller dispersion
of assets and, as a result, a smaller dispersion of x￿￿the standard deviation of x￿ is 0.8 percent
for this economy, compared to 3.3 percent for the benchmark.
Statistics for the high-volatility economy are presented in the right-most column of Table
2. For the high volatility economy assets and consumption di⁄er little between the employed
and unemployed. Re￿ ecting the small shocks to match quality, this economy exhibits a cross-
sectional standard deviation for (ln)wages of only 1.9 percent, which we view as unreasonably
small. Figure 5 presents the distribution of workers￿ln(wages) relative to reservation wage
ln(w￿). In order to match cyclical volatility of employment, this economy must exhibit a highly
elastic aggregate labor supply. This is re￿ ected in a distribution for the di⁄erential ln(w)￿ln(w￿)
that is limited to near zero￿ it averages only 3.0 percent for workers, with a standard deviation
equal to only 1.8 percent.9 A drop in match quality su¢ cient to reduce the wage by 10 percent,
9As with the benchmark economy, this dispersion is driven by dispersion in the wage, not w
￿. The standard
deviation of ln(w
￿) is only 0.6 percent. The correlation between ln(w) and ln(w
￿) is 0.24. For the benchmark
economy that correlation is 0.14.
12holding w￿ una⁄ected, would induce nearly 100 percent of workers to separate. Thus, while
we are able to generate large cyclical ￿ uctuations with this model, we highlight that there is a
severe tradeo⁄￿ achieving high cyclical volatility requires implausibly little dispersion in wages
from match quality.
5. Business cycle predictions
We next characterize the business cycles properties of the model in response to exogenous shifts
in aggregate productivity, contrasting results for the benchmark and high-volatility economies.
For aggregate monthly productivity shocks we use ￿z = 0:95 and ￿z = 0:0077. This yields a
time series for (logged) TFP, after quarterly averaging and HP ￿ltering, with autocorrelation of
0:84 and standard deviation of 2 percent. These coincide with the statistics reported by Shimer
(2005) for U.S. quarterly labor productivity. We focus on discussing relative volatilities and
correlations in describing the model results.
With aggregate ￿ uctuations, productivity z and the measures of workers, ￿ and  , are
state variables for agents￿optimization problems, as separation decisions depend on subsequent
matching probabilities. These, in turn, depend on the next period￿ s measures of workers. Be-
cause it is not possible to keep track of the evolution of these measures, we employ Krusell and
Smith￿ s (1998) ￿bounded rationality￿method which approximates the distribution of workers
by a limited number of its moments. In particular, we assume that agents make use of the
average asset holdings of the economy and the fraction of workers who are employed. (The
computational appendix gives more detail.). We generate 12,000 monthly periods for a model
economy. After dropping the ￿rst 3,000 observations, we log and HP ￿lter the data to produce
the business cycle statistics.10
Key statistics are highlighted in Table 3. In addition to our benchmark and high-volatility
economies, for comparison the table provides results for a model with linear utility, exogenous
separations, and no shocks to match quality. We refer to this, in Column 2, as the Shimer model
because it is similar to the model calibrated in Shimer (2005). Also for comparison, the ￿rst
column reports the comparable statistics reported by Shimer for quarterly U.S. data for 1951-
2003, where note that all standard deviations are expressed relative to that for labor productivity.
Shimer points out that the natural log of the unemployment series exhibits volatility, measured
by standard deviation, that is 9.5 times that in labor productivity, whereas for his calibrated
model unemployment displays lower volatility by a factor of about one half. Comparing results
10We use H-P smoothing parameter of 9 ￿ 10
5 on the monthly data to be comparable to Shimer￿ s treatment.
13for our Shimer model in Column 2 to the data essentially replicates this ￿nding￿ here the relative
standard deviation of unemployent to productivy falls short of the data by a factor of 16.
The cyclical results for our benchmark economy are given in Column 3. Unemployment is
twice as volatile as for the Shimer economy, though still short of that in the data by a factor of
eight. The increased volatility, compared to Shimer, largely re￿ ects the impact of ￿ uctuations
in separations. Separations are both volatile and countercyclical for the model: the standard
deviation for separations is nearly equal that for unemployment, while the correlation between
the rates of separations and unemployment is 0.34. (Separations lead the cycle for the model
economy, and so are more highly correlated, 0:85, with the change in unemployment rate.) The
correlation between Shimer￿ s data measure of separations and unemployment is even higher at
0:71; but separations for the data show a considerably lower standard deviation than that for
unemployment. The ￿nding rate for our benchmark model, like the data, is very procyclical
(correlation with unemployment of ￿0:93 for the model compared to ￿0:95 for the data). But
the volatility of the ￿nding rate, as with the Shimer economy, falls far short of that for the data.
Vacancies are actually less volatile and less cyclical for our model than for the Shimer economy.
This re￿ ects the model￿ s predicted increase in separations during contractions which, in turn,
encourages vacancy creation. The standard deviation of vacancies is only 0.6 for the model,
compared to the data￿ s 10:1, and the correlation with the unemployment rate is only ￿0:36,
compared to ￿0:89 for the data. Thus the model generates only a weak Beveridge curve relative
to the Shimer model, and especially relative to the data.
Finally, we turn to our high-volatility model, with results given in the last column of Table
3. The model by construction generates observed volatility in unemployment. Its standard
deviation for unemployment is eight times that produced by our benchmark model. Because it
exhibits many workers with little employment surplus, separations are much more volatile than
for the benchmark model￿ the standard deviation of separations is 9 times higher. This model
also generates much more cyclical vacancies. This primarily re￿ ects that expected surplus of
matches is only about one-tenth that for the benchmark economy. In other words, workers are
highly concentrated at the margin. Therefore, a shock to aggregate productivity wields a much
bigger percentage impact on expected surplus of matching. The high-volatility economy also
generates a considerable skewing of separations during downturns toward workers with higher
assets.11 This shift toward workers with higher assets and higher reservation wages in recessions
11Both the benchmark and high-volatility economies show high correlations (about 0.77) between the unem-
ployment rate and assets of the unemployed. But the impact of this cyclical selection on cyclicality of vacancies
14further drives down the value of vacancy creation. (This channel for volatility is distinctive to
our model having both risk aversion and endogenous separations.) To separately quantify the
impact of this cyclical sorting into unemployment by assets, we constructed a version of our high-
volatility model where separations are exogenous, but display the same time series properties
as the economy with endogenous separations.12 We ￿nd that the selection of workers into the
unemployment pool by assets increases the volatility of unemployment by about 12 percent.
Despite matching cyclical volatility of unemployment, the high-volatility economy displays
the qualitative shortcomings of our benchmark model. In particular, separations are far too
cyclical relative to vacancies. This model generates an even weaker Beveridge curve correlation
between unemployment and vacancies, ￿0:19, than the benchmark economy. Finally, we repeat
that this model can achieve its cyclicality for unemployment only by displaying an implausibly
low cross-sectional dispersion for wages of just 1:9 percent.
6. Conclusions
We have introduced worker heterogeneity, in worker assets and match quality, into a model
of separations, matching, and unemployment. We emphasize the trade-o⁄ between producing
realistic dispersion in wages or realistic cyclical ￿ uctuations in unemployment. We can generate
very high cyclicality of unemployment, comparable to U.S. data, if shocks to match quality are
small and payouts to unemployment are high. But we ￿nd this simultaneously implies dispersion
of less than two percent in wages due to match quality. We consider this implausible, given
estimates of wage dispersion controlling for worker and ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects (Woodcock, 2007). With
lower payouts to unemployment, comparable to Shimer￿ s calibration, and considerable match
productivity shocks, we can generate a realistic dispersion in wages. But then the model falls
drastically short in capturing cyclical ￿ uctuations in unemployment of the magnitude displayed
by the data.
How might the model be extended to overcome this con￿ ict between realistic wage dispersion
and realistic unemployment cyclicality, while maintaining wage ￿ exibility? This requires that the
model produce little dispersion in the rents to employment, despite considerable dispersion in
wages due to match productivity. One way to generate small employment rents, with signi￿cant
is considerly greater for the high-volatility economy, re￿ ecting its much greater cyclicality of separations.
12We ￿rst estimate a two-variable VAR for productivity and the separation rate on data simulated from our
model with endogenous separations, where the separation rate depends on current and lagged productivity as well
as its own lag. We then employ the estimated VAR to generate shocks for separations as well as productivity for
the model simulations.
15wage dispersion, is to assume that productivity in the market and productivity in home tasks
are highly correlated across workers; this weakens the link from a worker￿ s relative productivity
in the market to comparative advantage in market work. But it is di¢ cult to make this case
for di⁄erences in market productivity that re￿ ect match quality￿ why would drawing a good
employer match be associated with comparably higher home productivity? Another approach is
to modify the environment to generate a stronger inverse relationship between a worker￿ s match
quality and the worker￿ s marginal utility of consumption. Our model, because it assumes no
insurance and limited borrowing, does generate higher consumption, and lower marginal utility
of consumption, for workers with higher match wages. But we anticipate that breaking the link
between match productivity and rents to employment would require extreme assumptions on
preferences and/or the availabiltiy of asset markets.
16A. Computational Algorithm
A.1. Steady-State Equilibrium
In steady state, the aggregate productivity z is constant at its mean and the measures of workers
￿ and   are invariant over time. Computing the steady-state equilibrium amounts to ￿nding i)
the value functions W(a;x), U(a) and J(a;x), ii) the decision rules a0
e(a;x), a0
u(a) and x￿(a),
iii) the wage schedule w(a;x), iv) the labor market tightness ￿, v) the time-invariant measures
￿(a;x) and  (a) that satisfy the equilibrium conditions given in subsection 2.5. The detailed
computational algorithm for steady state equilibrium is as follows.
1. Discretize the state space A￿X over which the value functions and wages are computed.
The stochastic process for the idiosyncratic productivity is approximated by the ￿rst-order
Markov process of which transition probability matrix is computed using Tauchen￿ s (1986)
algorithm.
2. Assume an initial value of ￿0.
3. Given ￿0, we solve the Nash bargaining and individual optimization problems to approxi-
mate wages, value functions, and decision rules in the steady state, which will be used to
compute the time-invariant measures.
1. Assume an initial wage schedule w0(a;x;￿0) for each (a;x) node.
2. Given w0(a;x;￿0), solve for the worker￿ s value functions, W(a;x;w0) and U(a;w0),
using equations (2.1) and (2.2) in the text. The value functions are approximated
using the iterative method. The utility maximization problems in the worker￿ s value
functions are solved through the Brent method. The decision rules a0
e(a;x;w0),
a0
u(a;w0) and x￿(a;w0) are obtained at each iteration of the value functions.
3. Compute wages that satisfy the de￿nition of J(a;x;w0) in (2.3) and the Nash bar-
gaining solution in (2.5) in the text. Speci￿cally, we solve for w1(a;x;￿0) for each
(a;x) node that satis￿es
















4. If w1(a;x;￿0) and w0(a;x;￿0) are close enough to each other, then move on to the
step 4 to compute invariant measures and the corresponding labor market thightness,
￿1. Otherwise, go back to the step 3.1 with a new guess for the wage schedule:
w0(a;x;￿0) = ￿ww1(a;x;￿0) + (1 ￿ ￿w)w0(a;x;￿0):
4. Using the converged decision rules a0
e(a;x;w0), a0
u(a;w0) and x￿(a;w0) given the converged
wage schedule w0(a;x;￿0) from the step 3.2 and 3.1, compute the time-invariant measures
￿(a;x;￿0) and  (a;￿0) by iterating the laws of motion for measures given in (2.6) and
(2.7). Then, compute the labor market tightness ￿1 that satis￿es the free-entry condition




u; ￿ x;￿0)de  (a0
u;￿0):
5. If ￿1 and ￿0 are close enough to each other, then we found the steady state. Otherwise,
go back to the step 3 with a new guess for the labor market tightness:
￿0 = ￿￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿0:
A.2. Equilibrium with Aggregate Fluctuations
Approximating the equilibrium in the presence of aggregate ￿ uctuations requires us to include
the aggregate productivity, z, and the measures of workers, ￿ and  , as state variables for agents￿
optimization problems. In order to make match separation decisions at the end of a period,
agents need to know their matching probabilities in the next period, p(￿t+1) and q(￿t+1), which
in turn depends on the next period￿ s measures of workers, ￿t+1(a;x) and  t+1(a). The laws of
motion for the measures are given in equations (2.6) and (2.7). It is impossible to keep track
of the evolution of these measures. We employ Krusell-Smith￿ s (1998) ￿Bounded Rationality￿
method which approximates the distribution of workers by a number of its moments. We assume
that agents in the economy make use of two ￿rst moments of the measures: the average asset




ad (a), and the number of employed workers,
18E =
R
d￿(a;x). Let ^ s denote a vector of aggregate state variables in the approximation of
equilibrium with ￿ uctuations. Then ^ s = (K;E;z). In addition we assume that the agents use
log-linear rules in predicting the current ￿, the future K and the future E.
1. Guess a set of prediction rules for the equilibrium labor market tightness (￿) in the current
period, the average asset of the economy (K0) and the number of employed workers (E0) in




￿;1 logK + b0




K;1 logK + b0




E;1 logK + b0
E;2 logE + b0
E;3 logz:
As is the case in the steady state computation, we approximate the stochastic process for
the aggregate productivity by the ￿rst-order Markov process of which transition probability
matrix is computed using Tauchen￿ s (1986) algorithm.
2. Given these prediction rules, we solve the individual optimization and wage bargaining
problems. This step is analogous to step 3 in the steady state computation, so we omit the
detailed description of computational procedure. However, the dimension of state variables
is now much larger: (a;x;^ s). Computation of the conditional expectations involves the
evaluation of the value functions not on the grid points along K and E dimensions since
K0 and E0 are predicted by the log-linear rule above. We polynomially interpolate the
value functions along the K dimension when necessary.
3. We generate a set of arti￿cial time series data f￿t;Kt;Etg of the length of 9,000 periods.
Each period, these aggregate variables are calculated by summing up 50,000 workers￿
decisions on asset accumulation and match separation, which are simulated using the
converged value functions, W(a;x;^ s), U(a;^ s), and J(a;x;^ s), the decision rules, a0
e(a;x;^ s),
a0
u(a;^ s) and x￿(a;^ s) from the step 2, and the assumed prediction rules for ￿, K0 and E0
from the step 1.
4. We obtain the new values for the coe¢ cients (b1￿ s) in the prediction functions through the
OLS using the simulated data from the step 3. If b0 and b1 are close enough to each other,
then we ￿nd the (limited information) rational expectations equilibrium with aggregate




i;j + (1 ￿ ￿b)b0
i;j;
where i = ￿;K;E and j = 0;￿￿￿ ;3.
The converged prediction rules and their accuracy, measured by R2, for the benchmark
calibration with h = 1 are as follows.
￿ Prediction for labor market thightness in the current period:
log￿ = 1:934 ￿ 0:05810logK + 0:4220logE + 0:14804logz; R2 = 0:9971
￿ Prediction for average asset holdings in the next period:
logK0 = 0:0096 + 0:9965logK ￿ 0:0071logE + 0:0457logz; R2 = 0:9999
￿ Prediction for number of employed workers in the next period:
logE0 = ￿0:0182 ￿ 0:0015logK + 0:6361logE + 0:0276logz; R2 = 0:9538
Overall, the estimated prediction rules are fairly precise as R2￿ s are close to 1, while the
prediction rule for average asset holdings provides the highest accuracy.
20Table 1: Parameter Values for Benchmark and High-Volatility Economies 
 
Parameter Description Benchmark  High-
volatility 
 
    
γ  Relative risk aversion  1  same 
r  Real interest rate (annualized)  6%  same 
β  Discount factor  0.9948  0.9949 
a  Borrowing constraint  -6.0  same 
θ  Steady state v/u ratio (normalized)  1  same 
α  Matching technology m(v, u) = .313 v
αu
1-α  0.5 same 
κ  Vacancy posting cost
  0.522 0.0785 
b  Unemployment benefit 
  0.4 same 
Β  Utility from leisure  0.15  0.506 
ρx  Persistence of idiosyncratic productivity ln x  0.97 same 
σx  Standard deviation of innovation to ln x 13.0%  1.38% 
      
 Table 2: Steady-state Statistics for Benchmark  
and High-Volatility Economies 
 
 Benchmark  High-
volatility 
    
Unemployment rate  6%  Same 
Separation rate  2%  Same 
Finding rate  31%  Same 
Average assets for employed  18.1  17.9 
Average assets for unemployed  14.7  18.1 
Standard deviation, assets  15.1  8.6 
Average consumption for employed  1.19  1.07 
Average consumption for unemployed  1.09  1.056 
Standard deviation, ln(wage)  18.0%  1.9% 
    
 
Notes:  See Table 1 for parameter values for two calibrations.  Table 3: Business Cycles for Benchmark and High-Volatility Economies 
 
 U.S.  Data
  Shimer Benchmark  High-
volatility 
        
Standard deviation (relative to 
productivity) for 
                
     ─ Unemployment rate  9.5  0.6  1.2  9.6 
     ─ Separation rate  3.8  0  1.1  10.0 
     ─ Finding rate  5.9  0.7  0.8  5.5 
     ─ Vacancy rate  10.1  1.0  0.6  3.3 
Correlation with unemployment rate 
for: 
      
     ─ Separation rate  0.71  0  0.34  0.31 
     ─ Finding rate  -0.95  -0.83  -0.93  -0.98 
     ─ Vacancy rate  -0.89  -0.60  -0.36  -0.19 
        
 
Notes:  Variables are in natural log form, e.g., unemployment rate refers to ln(unemployment 
rate).  Standard deviations are relative to productivity. Statistics for U.S. data are from Shimer 
(2005) which reflects the deviations from the H-P trend with smoothing parameter of 10
5 for 
1951 to 2003.  See Table 1 for parameter values for the two calibrations.  The simulated data 
from the models are monthly deviation from the H-P trend with smoothing parameter 9 x 10
5 . 
The productivity shock used in the simulation exhibits the same persistence and standard 
deviation to the U.S. quarterly data reported in Shimer (2005). 
 Figure 1: Benchmark Economy: Wages and Value Functions





















































x=1.18Figure 2: Benchmark Economy: Asset Distributions and Reservation Match Productivity










Panel A: Asset Distributions for Employed and Unemployed
 
 



























x*(a)Figure 3: Benchmark Economy: Distribution of Surplus Match Quality (lnw ¡ lnw¤)









 ln w − ln w* Figure 4: High-volatility Economy












Panel A: Asset Distributions for Employed and Unemployed
 
 
























x*(a)Figure 5: Distribution of Surplus Match Quality (lnw ¡ lnw¤): High Volatility Economy
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